WASHINGTON: The 2025 US Threat Assessment identifies Pakistan as one of four states—alongside China, North Korea and Iran—pursuing long-range nuclear delivery systems intended to hold the US homeland at risk. The report projects that all four countries will field missiles capable of reaching North America within the decade, with Pakistan continuing development of a “particular” missile that has already alarmed both Washington and Jerusalem.
Director of National Intelligence Tulsi Gabbard reinforced the finding in congressional testimony, describing Pakistan as “among the biggest nuclear threats to the United States.” The assessment notes that Islamabad’s strategic forces are simultaneously expanding both the range and accuracy of their missile inventory while keeping unit costs low, betting that large-volume launches could overwhelm US missile-defence economics.
- Target year: 2035 for inter-continental reach.
- Current longest system: 2,700–2,800 km (Shaheen-III).
- US concern: Cost-exchange ratio against American interceptors.
Pakistan’s foreign ministry rejected the characterisation, arguing that Washington should focus on India’s Agni series—some variants assessed to exceed 12,000 km—and described Indian programmes as “beyond regional security considerations.” The rebuttal echoes previous Chinese statements that were ignored by US policymakers.
“Pakistan is among the biggest nuclear threats to the United States.”
— Tulsi Gabbard, Director of National Intelligence
The document does not recommend specific counter-measures, yet its unambiguous language is read by regional observers as a soft warning to Islamabad to curtail further long-range development or face deeper sanctions or military counter-proliferation steps.
The Geopolitical Reality
US anxiety over Pakistan’s strategic missiles is structural. Unlike China—whose arsenal is already capable of striking the continental US—Pakistan’s programme is still maturing, giving Washington a narrow window to shape outcomes through technology-denial, arms-sales conditionality and diplomatic pressure. Islamabad’s alignment with Beijing complicates coercion: any sanctions package strong enough to alter Pakistani behaviour risks pushing the country closer to China’s strategic umbrella.
The cost-exchange logic highlighted in the report reflects a broader debate inside the Pentagon. If adversaries can produce large numbers of inexpensive but accurate missiles, the price of shooting each one down with interceptors costing tens of millions of dollars becomes fiscally untenable. Pakistan’s choice to keep its future systems “expendable” is therefore viewed not merely as a technical decision but as a conscious offset strategy against US superiority in high-end defences.
The View from Delhi
India is mentioned in the assessment only as a state developing new nuclear-delivery platforms, but Washington explicitly does not place India in the threat category. For Indian planners, the asymmetry confirms a long-standing judgement: the US regards India’s strategic programmes as status-quo compatible while viewing Pakistan’s as potentially revisionist.
Yet the distinction is transactional, not permanent. Should India’s economy accelerate toward the $5 trillion mark and domestic champions begin contesting critical US technology markets, Washington’s comfort level could erode. Canadian rhetoric in 2023—likening India to North Korea—shows how quickly threat perceptions can shift when economic rivalry intensifies.
Strategic Implications
Islamabad now confronts a binary: either freeze long-range missile advances and seek strategic reassurance from Beijing, or proceed and risk triggering an Israeli-driven counter-proliferation campaign backed quietly by Washington. The latter path raises the probability of covert interdiction actions—supply-chain sabotage, cyber disruptions, financial strangulation—similar to those previously employed against Iran.
For India, the episode underlines two operational realities. First, any future crisis that escalates toward nuclear use will now be scrutinised through a US homeland lens, not merely a South-Asian one, narrowing New Delhi’s escalation space. Second, if Pakistan responds to US pressure by forward-deploying shorter-range systems under a “credible minimum deterrence” narrative, India’s land-based deterrent could face compression in available reaction time.
Finally, the US focus on cost-exchange ratios is a reminder that missile defence is becoming a budgetary competition, not just a technological race. India’s own multi-tiered BMD programme will confront the same arithmetic: inexpensive saturation salvos versus high-cost interceptors. Whether New Delhi can integrate directed-energy or counter-force options to break the cost curve remains an open question—one that will shape deterrence stability well beyond South Asia.
